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1. Introduction 
The typical scenario of a bargaining problem is a situation where agents who possess an initial 
endowment – their status quo – come together in order to jointly bring about an outcome 
which is supposed to be superior to their individual initial position and which each of them 
would not have been able to achieve just by his or her own productive effort alone. More 
technically, a bargaining situation is characterized by a (compact and convex) set of produc-
tion possibilities, often described in terms of potentially feasible utility allocations, a status 
quo position before collaboration and at least one point of joint production which is strictly 
better for each agent than their own initial situation. John Nash (1950), Ehud Kalai and Meir 
Smorodinsky (1975), Alvin Roth (1979), Michael Maschler and Menahem Perles (1981), and 
several others have offered seminal solution concepts in this field. 
This cooperative environment has been worth exploring because of its relevance in many real-
life situations where people have conflicting interests but nevertheless are interested in mutu-
ally beneficial interaction. This, however, is not the scenario we wish to focus on in this pa-
per. We consider cases where several agents who possess some initial endowment face a situ-
ation where they are asked, perhaps forced, to give something away so that they will no long-
er be able to keep their status quo allocation. Such cases have only rarely been considered in 
economics. Closest to what we have in mind, though still substantially different, are cases of 
bankruptcy and bequest situations. In the former, various agents have claims of differing size 
against a bank or firm and the liquidation value that remains is not sufficient to satisfy all enti-
tlements. In the latter, a father, let’s say, made promises to his children but after his death, the 
heirs find out that the estate he left behind is not large enough to honor all promises. 
There are a few theoretical concepts which prescribe how the deficit or loss should be shared. 
Most prominent is the proportional solution, but also the egalitarian rule, the constrained 
equal awards solution, the constrained equal losses rule and the “contested garment” principle 
received considerable attention (for a characterization of these rules see, among others, Robert 
Aumann and M. Maschler (1985), Carmen Herrero and Antonio Villar (2001), and William 
Thomson (2003, 2013)). In addition, there are a few questionnaire results as well as findings 
from experimental games for such situations. Across all empirical investigations, the propor-
tional division of an overall loss turned out to be what most agents were willing to agree to 
but in cases where the discrepancy in the claims vector became larger, there was a tendency 
towards equality in final outcomes (Simon Gächter and Arno Riedl (2006), Kristof Bosmans 
and Erik Schokkaert (2009), Herrero, Juan Moreno-Ternero, and Giovanni Ponti (2010)).  
We should mention that apart from the three publications just mentioned, there exists a rela-
tively small literature in which the distribution of losses has been experimentally investigated 
as well, but these situations were staged almost always within two-person relationships so that 
they differ significantly from our own scenario. Most prominent among these are investiga-
tions set-up as an ultimatum game (Nancy Buchan et al. (2005), Xiaolin Zhou and Yan Wu 
(2011), Roger Berger et al. (2012)). Bernhard Borges and Jack Knetsch (1997) report the re-
sults of two experiments in which participants acted as arbitrators in a series of disputes over 
gains and losses between two parties. Eric van Dijk et al. (1999) present questionnaire results 
about the distribution of net profits and net losses among business partners on a flea market. 
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Our own experimental set-up is closely related to a study that two of the present authors did 
on burden sharing in countries that suffered from a severe financial crisis that gained momen-
tum after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 (Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2016). All 
these countries, in particular Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain introduced programs 
that became known as a policy of austerity where the population had to face all kinds of cuts 
in old-age retirement benefits, pensions, health coverage, and extra-payments which had been 
granted to them over many years. The experimental game of losses that we present in this 
paper by no means claims to be able to cover and depict such an overall economic situation in 
detail, but it is our hope that our simple set-up can, at least to some extent, mirror some of the 
features with which the general public was faced in those countries. We believe that the issue 
of loss division or burden sharing is of a much more general nature. It may become a real 
challenge for those who will be concerned. Without being more specific, we just mention the 
large number of refugees from Africa, Asia and the Near East who are heading for Europe in 
order to evade severe droughts or military conflicts or just hope for a more prosperous future. 
Another issue that will definitely concern future generations is the question where to deposit 
the nuclear waste coming from nuclear power plants either active or about to be dismantled 
shortly. 
Section 2 introduces a new theoretical model and its axiomatic characterization. We will show 
that this model together with the rule of “constrained equal awards” helps to distinguish solu-
tions that we gained from our experimental results. Section 3 provides a description of our 
simple game of losses and introduces the methods used to analyze the data. Section 4 contains 
the results. Descriptive statistics of group outcomes will be presented first. Then, we will fo-
cus on individual proposals, classify them with regard to the different models, and relate the 
proposals to the position of the proposer in the group and the demographic data that we were 
able to obtain. The paper ends with a few concluding remarks. The game protocol and the 
detailed results that we gathered at different universities are relegated to an appendix. 
 
2.  Theory 
Are there models that could describe and possibly predict the bargaining behavior of agents 
involved in a situation where losses have to be shared? As already mentioned in the introduc-
tion, the proportional solution, the constrained equal awards rule, and the constrained equal 
losses rule appear to be candidates to describe and analyze the agents’ behavior in such cir-
cumstances. In the following, we put forward a new model which contains the proportional 
rule as a special case but clearly collides with the constrained equal awards rule. Given our 
experimental set-up which we will describe after this section, it also contains the constrained 
equal losses rule as a special case. 
 
2.1 Basic setup 
A society consists of 𝑛 ≥ 2 individuals. 𝑁 = {1, ⋯ , 𝑛} denotes the individuals in the society. 
Each individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 is endowed with a certain amount of resources, money in this case, 
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𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0. The society incurs a loss 𝐿 with 0 < 𝐿 ≤ ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝜔𝑖. (𝐿, (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛)) is called a 
problem. Throughout this section, 𝐿 is given and fixed. Since 𝐿 is given, we shall write a 
generic problem as (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛). 
Let Ξ denote the following set of problems:  
 {(𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛): (0 < 𝐿 ≤ ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝜔𝑖), (𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁)}. 
For any problem 𝜉 = (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛) ∈ Ξ, let  
 𝜇(𝜉) =
𝜔1+⋯+𝜔𝑛
𝑛
 
denote the mean of 𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛. For any ?̅? > 0, let Ξ(?̅?) denote the set  
 {𝜉 = (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛) ∈ Ξ: 𝜇(𝜉) = ?̅?}. 
A sharing rule, 𝑓: Ξ → 𝐑𝑛, is such that, for each 𝜉 = (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛) ∈ Ξ, [𝑓𝑖(𝜉) ∈ 𝐑 for all 𝑖 ∈
𝑁] and [∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) ≥ 𝐿]. 
A sharing rule 𝑓 is the (
𝐿
𝑛
, 𝜇)-referenced rule if, for each ?̅? > 0, there exists 𝛼 such that  
 ∀𝜉 = (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛) ∈ Ξ(?̅?),    ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) =
𝐿
𝑛
+ 𝛼(𝜔𝑖 − 𝜇(𝜉)). 
Therefore, the (
𝐿
𝑛
, 𝜇)-referenced rule uses the average “burden” to everyone, 
𝐿
𝑛
, as the 
reference and then adds to this reference level a proportion of the gap between an individual’s 
endowment and the mean of individuals’ endowments to compute individual 𝑖’s share.   
 
Remark 1.  It may be noted that if 𝛼 = 0  or if there is equality in initial endowments, the (
𝐿
𝑛
,
𝜇)-referenced rule becomes the equal-division rule.  
Remark 2.  It may be noted that 𝛼 depends on the mean of endowments.  In particular, when 
𝛼 =
𝐿
𝑛𝜇
, then 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) = 𝛼𝜔𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, and, as a consequence, the (
𝐿
𝑛
, 𝜇)-referenced rule  
becomes the proportional rule.  
 
2.2 Axioms 
Symmetry: For all 𝜉 = (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛) ∈ Ξ, if 𝜔1 = ⋯ = 𝜔𝑛, then 𝑓1(𝜉) = ⋯ = 𝑓𝑛(𝜉). 
Independence of Rank-and-Mean-Preserving Changes: For all 𝜉 = (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛) and 𝜉
′ =
(𝜔1
′ , ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛
′ ) ∈ Ξ with [for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, 𝜔𝑖 ≤ 𝜔𝑗 ⇒ 𝜔𝑖
′ ≤ 𝜔𝑗
′], if 𝜇(ξ) = 𝜇(𝜉′), then, for any 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, [𝜔𝑖 = 𝜔𝑖
′ ⇒ 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) = 𝑓𝑖(𝜉
′)]. 
Efficiency: For all 𝜉 = (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛) ∈ Ξ,  ∑𝑖∈𝑁 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) = 𝐿. 
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Monotonicity in Contributions: For all 𝜀 ∈ 𝐑 , there exists a continuous function 𝑔: 𝐑 → 𝐑 
such that, for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, all 𝜉 = (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛) and 𝜉
′ = (𝜔1
′ , ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛
′ ) ∈ Ξ, if 𝜇(𝜉) = 𝜇(𝜉′) and 
𝜔𝑖
′ = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜀, then 𝑓𝑖(𝜉
′) = 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) + 𝑔(𝜀). 
Symmetry says that if everyone has the same endowments, then they should share the loss 
equally. 
Independence of Rank-and-Mean-Preserving Changes requires that, for two sets of 
endowments with the same mean and the same rank order of the individuals in terms of their 
endowments, if an individual has the same amount of endowments in the two situations, then 
this individual’s share of the loss should be the same. 
Efficiency merely requires that the total contributions by all the players must be the loss that 
is to be shared. 
Monotonicity in Contributions requires that the incremental change of an individual’s 
contribution to the share of the loss depends on the net change of his endowments if, after the 
possible change of individuals’ endowments, the mean remains unchanged. 
 
2.3 Theoretical result 
Theorem 2.1  A sharing rule 𝑓 on 𝛯 satisfies Symmetry, Independence of Rank-and-Mean-
Preserving Changes, Efficiency and Monotonicity in Contributions if and only if it is the 
(
𝐿
𝑛
, 𝜇)-referenced rule.  
Proof.  It can be checked that the (
𝐿
𝑛
, 𝜇)-referenced rule satisfies Symmetry, Independence of 
Rank-and-Mean-Preserving Changes, Efficiency and Monotonicity in Contributions. In what 
follows, we shall show that, if a sharing rule 𝑓 on 𝛯 satisfies Symmetry, Independence of 
Rank-and-Mean-Preserving Changes, Efficiency and Monotonicity in Contributions, then it is 
the (
𝐿
𝑛
, 𝜇)-referenced rule. 
Let 𝑓 on Ξ satisfy Symmetry, Independence of Rank-and-Mean-Preserving Changes, 
Efficiency and Monotonicity in Contributions. We show that 𝑓 is the (
𝐿
𝑛
, 𝜇)-referenced rule. 
Let 𝜉 = (𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛) ∈ Ξ and consider 𝜉
𝜇 = (𝜔1
𝜇, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛
𝜇) ∈ Ξ such that [𝜔𝑖
𝜇 = 𝜇(𝜉) for all 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁]. By Symmetry and Efficiency, 
 𝑓𝑖(𝜉
𝜇) =
𝐿
𝑛 
   for  all   𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.  
Consider max{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛} and min{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛}. If max{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛} = min{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛}, then 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝜇(𝜉) for all i ∊ N. It then follows immediately that, in this case, for all i ∊ N  
𝑓𝑖(𝜉) =
𝐿
𝑛
+ 𝛼(𝜔𝑖 − 𝜇(𝜉)) for any 𝛼.  
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Suppose now that max{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛} > min{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛}. Without loss of generality, let 𝜔𝑛 =
max{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛} and 𝜔1 = min{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛}. Let 𝜀 = min{𝜔𝑛 − 𝜇(𝜉), 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜔1}. Note that 
𝜀 > 0. 
Consider the case in which 𝜀 = 𝜔𝑛 − 𝜇(𝜉) first. Take any 𝜀1, 𝜀2 ∈ [0, 𝜀] such that 𝜀1 + 𝜀2 = 𝜀 
and three problems 𝜉1 = (𝜔1
1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛
1), 𝜉2 = (𝜔1
2, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛
2), 𝜉3 = (𝜔1
3, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛
3) ∈ Ξ such that  
 𝜔1
1 = 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜀1,    𝜔𝑛
1 = 𝜇(𝜉) + 𝜀1,    𝜔𝑗
1 = 𝜇(𝜉)    ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁\{1, 𝑛} 
 𝜔1
2 = 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜀2,    𝜔𝑛
2 = 𝜇(𝜉) + 𝜀2,    𝜔𝑗
2 = 𝜇(𝜉)    ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁\{1, 𝑛} 
 𝜔1
3 = 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜀,    𝜔𝑛
3 = 𝜇(𝜉) + 𝜀,    𝜔𝑗
3 = 𝜇(𝜉)   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁\{1, 𝑛}. 
By Monotonicity in Contributions, there exists a continuous function 𝑔: 𝐑 → 𝐑 such that  
 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
1) = 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
𝜇) + 𝑔(𝜀1),    𝑓𝑛(𝜉
2) = 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
𝜇) + 𝑔(𝜀2) (1) 
 and  
 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
3) = 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
𝜇) + 𝑔(𝜀1 + 𝜀2),    𝑓𝑛(𝜉
3) = 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
1) + 𝑔(𝜀2). (2) 
From equation (2), we have  
 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
𝜇) + 𝑔(𝜀1 + 𝜀2) = 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
1) + 𝑔(𝜀2).  
Noting equation (1), we then obtain  
 𝑔(𝜀1 + 𝜀2) = 𝑔(𝜀1) + 𝑔(𝜀2). (3) 
This is the Cauchy equation. Its unique solution is given by (see Aczél (1966)):  
                      for all t ⩾ 0, 𝑔(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑡   for some constant  𝛼.  
Therefore,  
 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
3) = 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
𝜇) + 𝛼(𝜔𝑛 − 𝜇(𝜉)) =
𝐿
𝑛
+ 𝛼(𝜔𝑛 − 𝜇(𝜉)).  
By Independence of Rank-and-Mean-Preserving Changes and noting that 𝜔𝑛
3 = 𝜇(𝜉) + 𝜀 =
𝜔𝑛 in this case, we have  
 𝑓𝑛(𝜉) = 𝑓𝑛(𝜉
3) =
𝐿
𝑛
+ 𝛼(𝜔𝑛 − 𝜇(𝜉)). (4) 
By Independence of Rank-and-Mean-Preserving Changes and noting that 𝜇(𝜉) = 𝜇(𝜉3) and 
𝜔𝑖
3 = 𝜇(𝜉) for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁\{1, 𝑛}, we also have  
 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁\{1, 𝑛}: 𝑓𝑖(𝜉
𝜇) = 𝑓𝑖(𝜉
3) = L/n 
Applying the above arguments to 𝑓1 and noting that, for the case analyzed here, 𝜀 = 𝜔𝑛 −
𝜇(𝜉) = min{𝜔𝑛 − 𝜇(𝜉), 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜔1}, we can obtain  
 𝑓1(𝜉
3) = 𝑓1(𝜉
𝜇) − 𝛼(𝜔𝑛 − 𝜇(𝜉)).  
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Now, consider max{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛−1}. Without loss of generality, let 𝜔𝑛−1 = max{𝜔1, ⋯ , 𝜔𝑛−1}. 
By repeating the procedures for 𝑓1 and 𝑓𝑛 above, we can show that  
      𝑓1(𝜉) = 𝐿/𝑛 + 𝛼(𝜔1 − 𝜇(𝜉)),  if min{𝜔𝑛−1 − 𝜇(𝜉), 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜔1
3} = 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜔1
3 
or  
𝑓𝑛−1(𝜉) = 𝐿/𝑛 + 𝛼(𝜔𝑛−1 − 𝜇(𝜉)), if min{𝜔𝑛−1 − 𝜇(𝜉), 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜔1
3} = 𝜔𝑛−1 − 𝜇(𝜉). 
And by repeating the above, we can obtain  
    for  all   𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) =
𝐿
𝑛
+ 𝛼(𝜔𝑖 − 𝜇(𝜉)). (5) 
The case in which 𝜀 = 𝜇(𝜉) − 𝜔1 can be dealt with analogously to the above argument, and 
we can obtain equation (5) as well. This completes the proof.  
In the section that follows, our experimental game is presented where n is set equal to four. In 
the base game, there is equality in initial endowments. In the analysis, we shall, however, 
focus on a situation of unequal endowments. 
 
3.  Methods 
3.1 A game of losses and the experimental setup 
The detailed protocol of our game on loss sharing and the complete instructions given to the 
participants can be found in Appendix A1. In each experimental session, participants are as-
signed to a group of four individuals. Starting from an initial distribution of endowments in 
terms of real money (Euros), a loss has to be shared. The initial endowment in the base game 
is 10 Euros for each player. The group is then asked to give back a total of 10 Euros to the 
experimenter. In our variant of this game with unequal endowments on which this paper fo-
cuses in particular, a total amount of 50 Euros is distributed randomly to the four participants 
in each group where the assignment vector is (5, 10, 15, 20). Again, the players are informed 
that a total amount of 10 Euros has to be handed back to the experimenter. 
One randomly chosen member within each group will have to make a first proposal of how to 
distribute the loss of 10 Euros among the members of this group. Proposals that lead to indi-
vidual losses higher than a person’s initial endowment are not accepted. After this first pro-
posal, the other members of the group are asked to either accept or reject the proposal. These 
players have one minute to make a decision. Should they remain “silent”, this will be taken as 
acceptance of the proposal. If the proposal is accepted by all members of the group, the exper-
iment is over for these four players. 
Should there be no agreement after the first round, i.e. at least one of the three other group 
members objects, a second person in this group, again determined by chance but, of course, 
different from the first, will have to make a proposal of how to split up the loss of 10 Euros. 
As long as no agreement on some proposal is reached among the group members, a new per-
son is randomly chosen to propose a distribution of the loss. 
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Whenever at any point in the game, one proposal receives unanimous agreement, the experi-
ment is over and the procedure is as described above. There is a 20-minute time limit for each 
experiment. If after 20 minutes, no past proposal received unanimous support, the experiment 
is terminated automatically. In this case, a random mechanism will pick one of the past pro-
posals as the final decision on the share of the loss. Participants are aware of this and any oth-
er time limit during the experiment. 
Finally, at the end of each game, students were asked to answer a few questions that con-
cerned personal data, namely age, gender, family income in the past, future expected income 
and own political orientation. The last three answers had to be indicated on scales ranging 
from 1 (low resp. left) to 7 (high resp. right). 
[Table 1 here] 
We ran our experimental game on loss sharing between October 2015 and June 2016 at the 
Technical University of Berlin, the University of Ireland in Galway, the University of Halle-
Wittenberg, and the University Carlos III in Madrid. Table 1 provides an overview of all ses-
sions. Almost all students who participated in these experiments were enrolled in either eco-
nomics or business administration and had been invited by our local collaborators. Overall, 
we had 35 groups of four players each. We ran five experiments at the universities of Berlin 
and Halle with an equal endowment among all players within a group. In such a situation, it 
would be strange to expect anything different from an equal share of the loss, but we wanted 
to confirm that the general setting of the game is coherent and that departures from equal 
share are mainly triggered by the unequal endowment in our main situation. In fact, after a 
few rounds all five groups agreed on an equal split of the losses. Therefore, our focus is on the 
30 groups that faced the situation of unequal endowment. 
In each session, all students entered the room together and were randomly placed at the com-
puters so that they could not identify the other members of their group of four. At the begin-
ning of the experiment, the experimenter read the instructions aloud and students could follow 
the text on their computer screen. Then they could ask questions. The bargaining process for 
all groups did not start until all questions had been answered.  
The endowments were randomly assigned to the four participants in each group. Due to the 
structure of our experiment, some groups reached an agreement quite early while other groups 
used the entire 20 minutes. However, all students in a session had to stay and remain silent 
until the last group had finished the experiment in order to guarantee anonymity. At the end of 
the experiment, students had to jointly leave the room. After a couple of minutes, they were 
invited to successively enter the room again and receive their final net amount in an envelope 
with their personal code number in order to preserve complete anonymity. The entire experi-
ment usually lasted about 45 minutes plus the payment procedure. The average earning was 
12.50 Euros in situations with unequal endowments and 7.50 Euros in the case of equal en-
dowments. 
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3.2 Statistical methods 
How would or could a proposal or a final solution to our experimental game look like? A pri-
ori, “everything” can happen as long as the participants are not primed in one way or another, 
which was not the case in our series of experiments. Nevertheless, we are mainly interested in 
the support for either of the two models, namely the constrained equal awards rule (CEA) and 
the behavioral rule described and characterized in section 2. For the initial endowment vector 
(5, 10, 15, 20), the CEA rule prescribes a loss vector of (0, 0, 2.5, 7.5). In contrast, our new 
model prescribes the following loss vectors for four different values of parameter alpha: 
(2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5) for 𝛼 = 0,          (1, 2, 3, 4) for 𝛼 = 1/5, 
(0.625, 1.825, 3.125, 4.375) for 𝛼 = 1/4,    and  (0, 1 2/3, 3 1/3, 5) for 𝛼 = 1/3. 
In our example, 𝛼 = 0 leads to equality of losses, whereas 𝛼 = 1/5 results in proportionality in 
loss shares. Furthermore, 𝛼 = 1/3 yields a solution in which the person with the lowest en-
dowment is exempted from carrying any losses. In the case of 𝛼 = 1/4, the higher endowed 
persons carry a larger burden compared to proportionality while no group member is com-
pletely exempted.  
Clearly, one cannot expect players to propose exactly the loss shares yielded by the last two 
alpha values, but we think that a final solution of, for example, (0, 2, 3, 5)  is “close” to the 
case of 𝛼 = 1/3 and a solution of  (0.5, 2, 3, 4.5)  is “close” to the case of  𝛼 = 1/4. In the same 
vein, the loss vector (0, 0, 3, 7) is “close” to the CEA solution. As we will report in section 4, 
we observe indeed several corresponding solutions. 
To make such “closeness” considerations more precise, we take up an idea that was employed 
in one of Gächter and Riedl’s (2006) studies, namely to calculate for any proposal that was 
made the absolute difference expressed by the Euclidean distance of this answer from CEA on 
one side and from the four versions our model on the other. 
In a first step, we focus on final group outcomes, classify all non-random solutions with re-
spect to their distance to the closest of the rule-based vectors of concern, and comment on 
specific characteristics of these allocations of losses. 
In a second step, rather than focusing on final results we look at all proposals that were made 
during all rounds. We think that it is worthwhile to study how these intermediate proposals 
that did not necessarily lead to a final solution on which all members of the group agreed 
looked like in relation to CEA and our model. We follow again Gächter and Riedl (2006) and 
rank our rule-based solutions according to their absolute difference towards each proposed 
vector of allocated losses. 
In a third step, we shed light on possible explanations for the implicit choice of a rule. Hence, 
similar to the second step we consider again which of the rule-based solutions is closest to an 
allocation of losses proposed and relate this information to socio-demographic characteristics 
of the corresponding proposer, but also to group-specific attributes including his endowment, 
the number of previous rounds, and the place of the experiment. First, we use non-parametric 
tests to compare the distribution of answers on the five rule-based solutions between different 
groups of respondents. Second, we estimate a multinomial logistic regression model in which 
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the five solutions form the categories of the dependent variable while the individual and 
group-specific characteristics serve as controls. We report marginal effects to give an impres-
sion of the strength of the effect observed. In each case, variance inflation factors are calculat-
ed to assess the severity of potential multicollinearity. According to David J. Sheskin (2011), 
a value above 5 would suggest a problem, but in our case the factors are always clearly below 
this threshold. All analyses have been conducted with the software package STATATM (ver-
sion 14). The programming and conduction of the experiment was done with the web-based 
“Software Platform for Human Interaction Experiments (SoPHIETM)” offered by SoPHIE 
Labs (www-sophielabs.com). 
 
4.  Experimental results 
To structure the presentation of our results for the case of unequal endowments, we begin by 
describing the final allocations of all groups with such endowments. Afterwards, we turn to 
all individual proposals irrespective of acceptance or rejection by the other group members. 
An overview of all proposals and reactions can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 
4.1 Group decisions: Descriptive results 
Table 2 provides an overview of the outcomes of all 30 sessions with unequal endowments. 
Nine of these groups did not reach an agreement so that the final allocation was decided at 
random. In column 3 of Table 2, the final loss vector is specified for each group, given that 
there was unanimous agreement within 20 minutes. Note that for the individual loss, we use 
Li as a short form of what we denoted as 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) in the theoretical model in Section 2. For ex-
ample, L5 refers to the final loss of the player with the lowest initial endowment. Column 4 
reports the number of rounds played in each group. The corresponding values vary remarka-
bly. While in six groups all members accepted the very first proposal, in two other groups it 
took 16 rounds to reach unanimous agreement. 
[Table 2 here] 
Column 5 specifies the proposer of a final solution to which everyone agreed. For example, 
P15 means that the final proposal was made by the player who had an initial endowment of 15 
Euros. The probability of acceptance by all other group members does not depend on the en-
dowment of the proposer. On the one hand, this is certainly due to the fact that there is strict 
anonymity so that respondents are not aware of any information about the proposer including 
his or her endowment. On the other hand, it seems that even participants with high endow-
ment are able to identify allocations which are acceptable for individuals with low endow-
ments. 
Finally, the last two columns of Table 2 relate the proposals to the different theoretical mod-
els. As already explained in subsection 3.2, we calculate the Euclidean distance between the 
final loss vector for all non-random solutions and the closest vector corresponding to any of 
the five rule-based solutions whose underlying model is also stated in Table 2. As expected, 
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individuals prefer to state allocations by using integer values as is the case for the proportional 
solution. Hence, it is remarkable that three groups reached agreement on a vector which ex-
actly corresponds to the CEA solution (0, 0, 2.5, 7.5). 
If we postulate, admittedly somewhat arbitrarily, that a value between zero and one for the 
Euclidean distance defines closeness, then out of 21 final (non-random) solutions, we would 
have six solutions supported by CEA and seven solutions supported by our model. If we allow 
a higher value to be acceptable, we get more support for either rule and could, similarly to 
Gächter and Riedl (2006), finally classify each proposal accordingly. 
A note of caution is necessary, however. A higher upper value of this distance also indicates a 
larger distance of the proposal from the corresponding rule-based solution. Just as an exam-
ple, the loss allocation (0, 0.75, 3, 6.25) is quite far away from what CEA prescribes. The 
CEA rule and our model represent different views of how losses should be shared. While 
CEA tends to equalize final outcomes by sparing or exempting those at the lower end, our 
model requires, at least in the realm of those alpha values that we consider, positive contribu-
tions from almost everyone, proportionality in burden sharing being one of the options. Nev-
ertheless, the Euclidean distance simply states that an allocation proposed is closer to one 
rule-based solution compared to any alternative solution considered. Hence, we will follow 
this interpretation in the next subsection. 
 
4.2 Individual proposals: Descriptive results 
Above, we were focusing on final outcomes and saw that in many cases the CEA rule and our 
model got substantial support. This, however, is not the full picture. If, for the moment, we 
ignore those cases that led to random solutions, Table 2 has already shown that in many other 
cases, several rounds were needed until a unanimous decision was reached. Consequently, in 
a second step we also want to look at proposals that were made during all rounds. 
However, let us first consider those allocations of losses which we call “antagonistic”. Off 
and on, a proposal was made that assigned the full burden to one single player, in particular to 
the person with the highest endowment. Whenever such a proposal was made, either once or 
several times, either by the same player or by several members of this group, the chances 
were very high that the final solution after 20 minutes was determined randomly. More pre-
cisely, eight out of ten experiments with an antagonistic proposal were finally decided via a 
random mechanism. One interpretation for this fact is that such proposals tended to elicit 
“nasty” counter-proposals so that the psychological climate within this group “went down the 
drain”. 
Table A2 and Table A3 in the Appendix give more details. A particularly illustrative example 
for this kind of behavior is group 2 in Berlin. In round 9, player P20 (i.e., the player with an 
initial endowment of 20 Euros) proposed the loss vector (5, 5, 0, 0). In the next round, P5 pro-
posed (0, 0, 0, 10). Then P10 proposed (0, 1, 3, 6) which was rejected by P20. In the following 
two rounds, P15 proposed a proportional split (1, 2, 3, 4) which was rejected by all the others. 
In round 14, player P20 proposed (0, 10, 0, 0) which got rejected; it would have left P10 with 
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nothing. In the following four rounds, either P10 or P5 made proposals which would have 
placed the bulk of the loss on P20’s shoulders. This was, of course, rejected by P20 but out of 
solidarity or not, P15 went along with this decision. In the remaining rounds, P20 again pro-
posed twice to put the burden exclusively on P10. In the following analyses, we exclude all 23 
antagonistic proposals. Obviously, underlying motives of such proposers clearly differ from 
the ones of our model and CEA. 
[Table 3 here] 
Next, we rank the rule-based solutions according to their distance to each proposal. Table 3 
gives the respective results for the remaining 214 proposals. It turns out that the proposals are 
best approximated by our model within the interval 1/4 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1/3, which can be seen from the 
mean values of the Euclidean distance and also from the mean ranks for these alpha-values. In 
fact, 72 out of 214 proposals are best described by our model with 𝛼 = 1/3, while the model 
with 𝛼 = 1/4 ranks highest or second-highest for 121 proposals. In contrast, the equal losses 
option with 𝛼 = 0 does not perform well. 
Results are mixed for CEA. This rule fares well with respect to first rank but it is the worst 
predictor for proposals in 89 cases. Consequently, the mean rank of CEA is rather weak. 
Hence, a model that mildly charges participants with low endowment seems to be a good pre-
dictor for many proposals, while for some individuals either CEA or proportionality seems to 
be more attractive. 
 
4.3 Individual proposals and confounding factors 
In the third step, we come back to the first-ranked theoretical solutions and try to elucidate at 
least some potential explanations for the allocations proposed during the bargaining procedure 
and the implicit choice of a particular theoretical model. From the structure and the proceed-
ing of our experiment some potentially relevant factors are rather obvious, including the en-
dowment of a proposer, the number of rounds played before a particular proposal or the site of 
the experiment. Furthermore, Table 4 reports summary statistics of the socio-demographic 
characteristics that have been collected at the end of the experiment. 
[Table 4 here] 
As we have conducted our experiment with students from economics departments at different 
universities there is only little variation with respect to age and the majority of participants are 
male students. Furthermore, the 7-point scales for family income ten years ago, expected in-
come in ten years’ time, and political orientation are each merged into three categories. The 
data in Table 4 shows that about 46 percent of the respondents declared that they grew up in a 
(rather) rich family. Even more remarkably, 78 percent expect to earn a high or very high in-
come in the future. In fact, only 17 individuals assume to fall into a lower income category 
than their family. With respect to their political orientation, the students in the sample slightly 
tend to the left on average. 
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To illustrate potential effects from individual and group-specific characteristics Table A4 in 
the Appendix presents the distribution of answers on the five rule-based loss allocations for 
different groups of individuals. We report corresponding Pearson chi-squared test statistics to 
evaluate the significance of respective overall differences. Furthermore, the multinomial lo-
gistic regression model reported in Table 5 enables us to investigate differences between dif-
ferent socio-demographic groups with respect to single rule-based solutions while controlling 
for other confounders. 
In the following, we focus on the most remarkable results. We observe strong endowment 
effects which likely indicate self-interest motives. Participants with higher endowment of 15 
or 20 Euros more often propose allocations in accordance with equal losses or proportionality. 
In contrast, individuals with lower endowment more regularly suggest allocations which 
completely exclude themselves from carrying any loss (i.e. CEA in the case of 10 Euros; 𝛼 =
1/3 in the case of 5 Euros). According to the χ2 test reported in Table A4 these differences are 
highly statistically significant (p-value < 0.001). Furthermore, these observations are con-
firmed by the regression results. 
From the regression coefficients it can also be seen that an equal allocation of losses is more 
often proposed in earlier rounds of the game (p=0.007) and by younger participants (p=0.041) 
if we control for endowment effects. Such equality ideas may turn out to be rather naïve after 
a few rounds. Also, older students seem to drift away from the idea of equal losses. 
Furthermore, some gender differences appear with respect to the CEA solution. Women more 
often than men propose to completely exclude the two individuals with lower endowments 
from any losses (p=0.016). This observation is in line with many findings in the literature 
starting with Carol Gilligan’s (1982) claim that women are more likely to follow a care per-
spective. 
While the income of the family in which the participant grew up has no clear impact, the 
overall effect of future income expectations is strong (see χ2 test in Table A4; p=0.002), alt-
hough the group of those who assume to earn a low or middle income is rather small. If a per-
son expects to belong to an upper income class in the future, the probability to propose a pro-
portional split of losses decreases by 22.5 percent (p=0.031) while the probability of exclud-
ing one or even two group members from carrying any losses significantly increases by 22.1 
percent (p=0.045) and 18.4 percent (p<0.001) respectively. Having controlled for endowment 
effects, this result may indicate a concern for poorer individuals. 
Additionally, participants who indicate a political orientation to the right are much more like-
ly to propose a solution close to our model with α = 1/4 (p=0.038) while the probability of 
proposing an allocation in accordance with the model with α = 1/3 decreases by 32.3 percent 
(p=0.003) compared to left-oriented individuals. Maybe these differences, which are again 
confirmed by our χ2 test, reveal typical disparities associated with different political convic-
tions. 
Finally, there are also some strong local differences. However, we suppose that the different 
groups are quite heterogeneous so that further interpretations may not be valid. Nevertheless, 
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it seems to be important to control for these place effects to get more reliable results for the 
other individual and group-specific characteristics. 
In Subsection 4.1 and especially in Table 2, we reported that 9 out of 21 final solutions were 
closest to the CEA model. In some contrast, according to our multinomial logistic regression 
model in Table 5, only 14.5 percent of all proposals have been closest to the CEA model 
while the predicted probability of observing an allocation which is closest to our model with α 
= 1/3 equals 46.9 percent. Hence, it appears that the different specifications of our model ex-
pressed by the α-values quite comprehensively explain the different proposals on the way to a 
commonly accepted allocation of losses. But in the specific setting of the experiment with 
veto power for all group members, participants may at some point realize that an agreement 
would be more easily achieved if the two lower endowed individuals were fully exempted 
from any losses. 
 
5.  Discussion and conclusion 
Given an allocation of unequal initial endowments, how should a loss be shared among those 
who are concerned? The paper started out with the axiomatic characterization of a simple 
model which proposes a possible solution to this problem. Our model uses an equal share of 
the loss and the average endowment of those involved as reference points. In experiments at 
four universities we were interested to see how our model would fare against other rules, in 
particular against a scheme that was proposed in cases of bankruptcy and bequest, namely the 
constrained equal awards rule CEA. In our experimental set-up where within each group of 
players with an unequal initial endowment, the proposer in each round of bargaining was not 
known to the other group members, CEA and our model were implicitly chosen in roughly 
equal numbers. Implicit means that the students who played this game had been introduced 
neither to these models nor to any other alternative decision modes. In sharp contrast to this 
observation, our model with an α-value of 1/3 was closest to almost every second proposal. 
We already mentioned that our concept of closeness is somewhat arbitrary, admittedly lacking 
a more basic foundation. However, a small deviation from a model’s prescribed values seems 
to support that model’s predictability. It should be obvious that one cannot expect students to 
pick distributions of losses that exactly correspond to a model’s prescription, all the more be-
cause our model is continuous in relation to different alpha values. Therefore, the considera-
tion of small Euclidean distances appears to us to make a lot of sense. 
In addition to these findings, we observed quite a few cases where the final solution to the 
burden sharing problem was not achieved by mutual agreement but was, after a deadline of 
twenty minutes of bargaining, determined randomly. In eight of these ten cases, there had 
been proposals that were aimed at distributing the total loss very unevenly. One of these cases 
was described in some detail in Subsection 4.2. These proposals may have poisoned the at-
mosphere among the agents. In such cases, it seems to be a hopeless undertaking to describe 
proposals and counter-proposals by a model of rational decision making. Anger and frustra-
tion may have been the dominating factors in such situations. 
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This last observation leads to the question whether a final solution, either via unanimous 
agreement or determined randomly, can be better understood by focusing on the whole se-
quence of proposals over time. A closer analysis of this procedural aspect appears worth do-
ing but would need more data than obtained so far. 
We find two other aspects particularly worth focusing on, and these will be the object of fu-
ture experiments:  
(a) How would a situation influence the bargaining over losses in which the initial endowment 
of each player is determined by the player’s success in a knowledge quiz? Would relative suc-
cess of a player be honored by the other members of this group? Would nasty proposals then 
occur much less frequently than in the experiments documented in this paper? 
(b) How and in what way would the bargaining procedure change if the endowment status of 
the proposer of a particular loss division were known to all the other players in his or her 
group? Would such information lead to more decency and collaboration so that the number of 
random solutions would considerably go down? 
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Table 1: Overview of sessions 
Place Date Equal Endowment Unequal Endowment 
Berlin January 28, 2016 3 groups 4 groups 
Galway November 26, 2015 --- 7 groups 
Halle April 30, 2015 2 groups 6 groups 
Halle June 23, 2016 --- 7 groups 
Madrid October 21, 2015 --- 6 groups 
Total number of individuals 20 120 
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Table 2: Final allocations of losses in the case of unequal endowments 
Place Group 
Final losses 
(L5, L10, L15, L20) 
Final 
round 
Proposer 
(Pi) 
Closest 
model 
Euclidean 
distance 
Berlin 1 Random 21    
 2 Random 23    
 3 (0, 2, 3, 5) 1 P15 𝛼 = 1/3 0.4714 
 4 (0, 0, 2.5, 7.5) 1 P5 CEA 0.0000 
       
Galway 1 (1, 1, 3, 5) 3 P15 𝛼 = 1/4 1.1456 
 2 Random 19    
 3 (0, 1, 4, 5) 7 P10 𝛼 = 1/3 0.9428 
 4 (0, 2, 3, 5) 5 P5 𝛼 = 1/3 0.4714 
 5 (0, 0, 2.5, 7.5) 7 P20 CEA 0.0000 
 6 (1, 2, 3, 4) 1 P5 𝛼 = 1/5 0.0000 
 7 Random 14    
       
Halle 2015 1 (0, 0, 5, 5) 9 P15 𝛼 = 1/3 2.3570 
 2 (4, 2, 2, 2) 1 P5 𝛼 = 0 1.7321 
 3 (0, 1, 2, 7) 16 P10 CEA 1.2247 
 4 (0.5, 2, 3, 4.5) 4 P20 𝛼 = 1/4 0.2500 
 5 Random 12    
 6 (0, 2, 3, 5) 1 P5 𝛼 = 1/3 0.4714 
       
Halle 2016 1 (0.25, 0.75, 2.5, 6.5) 7 P15 CEA 1.2748 
 2 Random 11    
 3 (0, 1, 3, 6) 2 P20 𝛼 = 1/3 1.2472 
 4 (0, 0, 3, 7) 2 P10 CEA 0.7071 
 5 (0, 0, 3, 7) 3 P10 CEA 0.7071 
 6 (0, 0.75, 3, 6.25) 16 P20 CEA 1.5411 
 7 Random 12    
       
Madrid 1 (2, 4, 2, 2) 1 P10 𝛼 = 0 1.7321 
 2 Random 15    
 3 (1, 2, 3, 4) 4 P20 𝛼 = 1/5 0.0000 
 4 (0, 0, 2.5, 7.5) 5 P5 CEA 0.0000 
 5 (0, 0, 3, 7) 2 P10 CEA 0.7071 
 6 Random 17    
Note: Li denotes the loss in Euro allocated to players with endowment level i and is a short 
form of 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) in the theoretical model. 
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Table 3: Ranking of theoretical solutions in relation to actual proposals excluding of antago-
nistic proposals: Absolute frequencies and mean Euclidean distance (n=214) 
 
𝛼 = 0: 
Equal losses 𝛼 = 1/3 𝛼 = 1/4 
𝛼 = 1/5: 
Proportional CEA 
1st rank: 
Frequencies 
Mean Euclidean  
distance (S.D.) 
 
27 
2.2555 
(1.8136) 
 
72 
1.0824 
(0.6202) 
 
28 
1.0133 
(0.6812) 
 
40 
0.2872 
(0.8409) 
 
47 
0.8045 
(0.5556) 
2nd rank: 
Frequencies 
Mean Euclidean  
distance (S.D.) 
 
0 
 
55 
2.5933 
(0.9061) 
 
93 
1.1377 
(0.7531) 
 
47 
2.7717 
(1.7975) 
 
19 
1.9240 
(0.1269) 
3rd rank: 
Frequencies 
Mean Euclidean 
distance (S.D.) 
 
7 
2.3684 
(1.3376) 
 
53 
1.5068 
(0.3718) 
 
93 
3.4638 
(1.2036) 
 
58 
1.7470 
(0.5889) 
 
4 
2.3847 
(0.3708) 
4th rank: 
Frequencies 
Mean Euclidean 
distance (S.D.) 
 
61 
2.6452 
(0.4994) 
 
32 
4.5631 
(1.7524) 
 
0 
 
69 
3.4868 
(0.8326) 
 
55 
3.2445 
(0.6232) 
5th rank: 
Frequencies 
Mean Euclidean 
distance (S.D.) 
 
119 
4.8229 
(1.0093) 
 
2 
6.2361 
(0.0000) 
 
0 
 
0 
 
89 
5.1272 
(1.6922) 
Mean Rank 4.14 
(1.3082) 
2.24 
(1.1024) 
2.30 
(0.6895) 
2.73 
(1.1054) 
3.56 
(1.6079) 
Euclidean dis-
tance: Total 
sample 
3.7979 
(1.5565) 
2.1445 
(1.5452) 
2.1323 
(1.5166) 
2.2602 
(1.5777) 
3.3583 
(2.0743) 
Note: Stated “Frequencies” indicate the number of observation for which the allocation pro-
posed is first, second, third, fourth and fifth closest, respectively, to the corresponding rule 
based on the Euclidean distance. “Mean Euclidean distance” corresponds to the subsample 
indicated in this cell. Standard deviations (S.D.) are given in brackets. In a few cases, the Eu-
clidean distance between a proposed loss vector and two different rule-based vectors is identi-
cal. Hence, the horizontal sum of frequencies in the table does not always add up to 214. An-
tagonistic proposals are omitted. 
  
21 
Table 4: Socio-demographic characteristics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age (in years) 22.91 3.669 18 37 
Sex (0=female, 1=male) 0.650  0 1 
Family income (1=very poor, 7 = very rich) 4.275 1.130 1 7 
     Low (answers 1-3) 0.233  0 1 
     Middle (answer 4) 0.308  0 1 
     High (answers 5-7) 0.458  0 1 
Future income (1=very low, 7 = very high) 5.142 1.048 2 7 
     Low (answers 1-3) 0.075  0 1 
     Middle (answer 4) 0.142  0 1 
     High (answers 5-7) 0.783  0 1 
Political orientation (1=left, 7 = right) 3.750 1.272 1 7 
     Left (answers 1-3) 0.375  0 1 
     Middle (answer 4) 0.417  0 1 
     Right (answers 5-7) 0.208  0 1 
Number of observations: n = 120. Only groups with unequal endowments are included. 
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Table 5: Multinomial logistic regression model for individual proposals 
 First ranked theoretical solution (n = 214, Pseudo R2=0.242) 
 
𝛼 = 0:  
Equal losses 
𝛼 = 1/5: 
Proportional 𝛼 = 1/4 𝛼 = 1/3 CEA 
 dy/dx (SE) dy/dx (SE) dy/dx (SE) dy/dx (SE) dy/dx (SE) 
Endowment (5, 10, 
15, or 20 Euros) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.022*** 
(0.008) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Round -0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Age (in years) -0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
Sex (0=female, 
1=male) 
0.073* 
(0.039) 
0.016 
(0.065) 
-0.043 
(0.062) 
0.099 
(0.104) 
-0.145** 
(0.060) 
Family income      
   Middle (answer 4) -0.012 
(0.049) 
0.344* 
(0.177) 
-0.187*** 
(0.070) 
-0.039 
(0.189) 
-0.106 
(0.070) 
   High (answers 5-7) 0.008 
(0.077) 
0.143 
(0.102) 
-0.099** 
(0.048) 
0.012 
(0.143) 
-0.064 
(0.075) 
Future income      
   High (answers 5-7) -0.010 
(0.066) 
-0.225** 
(0.105) 
-0.169 
(0.118) 
0.221** 
(0.110) 
0.184*** 
(0.051) 
Political orientation      
   Middle (answer 4) -0.126** 
(0.057) 
-0.023 
(0.054) 
0.161* 
(0.092) 
-0.159 
(0.111) 
0.148 
(0.106) 
   Right (answers 5-7) -0.013 
(0.045) 
-0.004 
(0.085) 
0.375** 
(0.180) 
-0.323*** 
(0.109) 
-0.035 
(0.082) 
Places      
   Berlin -0.035 
(0.053) 
-0.163*** 
(0.060) 
-0.100* 
(0.060) 
0.251 
(0.171) 
0.048 
(0.111) 
   Galway -0.070* 
(0.043) 
-0.178*** 
(0.055) 
-0.085 
(0.052) 
0.403*** 
(0.131) 
-0.068 
(0.073) 
   Halle 2016 -0.120*** 
(0.035) 
-0.262*** 
(0.045) 
-0.102*** 
(0.038) 
-0.001 
(0.185) 
0.484*** 
(0.153) 
   Madrid -0.080** 
(0.039) 
-0.160*** 
(0.049) 
-0.097** 
(0.043) 
0.274* 
(0.163) 
0.062 
(0.119) 
y=Pr(choice) (predict) 0.080 0.166 0.140 0.469 0.145 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and reported in parentheses. For dummy varia-
bles dy/dx refers to a discrete change from 0 to 1. Base case: female, family income: low (answers 1-
3), future income: low or middle (answers 1-4), political orientation: left (answers 1-3), place: Halle 
2015. Antagonistic proposals are omitted. Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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APPENDICES 
A.1 The Game Protocol 
Experiment: Loss Distribution 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read the instructions care-
fully. They are identical for all participants. The instructions are also made available to you in 
paper form. You are welcome to consult them at any time during the experiment. 
 You are taking part in an experiment where, starting from an initial distribution of en-
dowments in terms of real money, losses have to be shared. 
 You will be assigned to a group of four. At no point in the experiment, your identity 
will be disclosed nor will the identities of your other group members be revealed. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, an initial distribution of endowments will be de-
termined and announced, specifying the amount of Euros that each member of your 
group receives. 
[page break] 
 Your group will have to share a total loss of 10 Euros that will have to be given back 
to the experimenter at the end of the experiment. 
 One randomly chosen member of your group will make a first proposal of how to 
distribute the loss among the members of your group. 
 This and every other proposal that may follow has to be made within two minutes. 
 "Negative" losses are not acceptable nor are proposals for individual losses accepted 
that are higher than a person’s initial endowment. 
 This screenshot is an example for the input mask 
 
[page break] 
 You are then asked to either accept or reject this first proposal. You have one mi-
nute to make your decision. Should you remain "silent", this will be defined as ac-
ceptance. 
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 If the first proposal is accepted by all members of your group, the experiment is 
over and you will be paid your final net amount in cash at the day of the experiment. 
You will receive an envelope with your personal code number on it. 
 Should there be no agreement, a second person in your group (also determined by 
chance, but, of course, different from the first person) will have to make a proposal of 
how to split up the loss. 
 As long as no agreement on one proposal is reached among the group members, a new 
participant is chosen at random to propose a distribution of the loss of 10 Euros. 
 While a new proposer is always chosen randomly, no person will be asked to make a 
second proposal before all other members have made at least one proposal (proposers 
are drawn from a hat without replacing). 
 This last point equally applies in following rounds: Each participant will only get the 
chance to make his next proposal, after all players have also made at least one addi-
tional proposal. 
[page break] 
 If, at any point, one proposal receives unanimous agreement, the experiment is over 
and each participant receives his/her corresponding net payout as described above. 
 There is a 20 minutes time limit for the experiment. After each round the remaining 
time is stated. Once the time has run out, the current proposal can still be made and 
the votes on it can still be taken. 
 Please notice that if after these 20 minutes, none of the past proposals received unani-
mous support, the experiment is over. 
 In this case, a random mechanism will pick one of the past proposals within your 
group as the final decision on the share of the loss of 10 Euros. Payment will be made 
as indicated above. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to answer a couple of questions which are 
also treated fully anonymously. Thank you for this as well and thank you again for participat-
ing in this experiment! 
 
 
A.2   The Complete Data Set  
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Table A2: Overview of proposals and reactions 
 Proposal  Reactions (0=Accept, 1=Reject) 
Round L5 L10 L15 L20  P5 P10 P15 P20 
Berlin (Group 1) 
1 0 0 0 10  0 * 0 1 
2 0 1 3 6  * 1 0 1 
3 0 1 2 7  0 1 * 1 
4 0 3 3 4  0 1 0 * 
5 0 2 3 5  * 1 0 0 
6 0 2 7 1  1 1 1 * 
7 0 1 3.5 5.5  0 0 * 1 
8 5 0 0 5  1 * 1 1 
9 0 0 3.5 6.5  0 0 * 1 
10 0 0 3 7  0 * 0 1 
11 0 1 3 6  * 0 0 1 
12 0 3 3 4  0 1 1 * 
13 0 1.2 2.9 5.9  * 1 0 1 
14 0 0.5 4 5.5  0 0 * 1 
15 1 2 3 4  1 1 0 * 
16 0 0.38 4.63 4.99  0 * 1 1 
17 0 1.2 3.5 5.3  * 1 0 1 
18 0 0.8 4 5.2  0 0 * 1 
19 0.01 0.5 4.5 4.99  0 * 1 1 
20 0 2 5 3  0 1 1 * 
21 0 1 5 4  0 0 1 * 
      Timeout: Random solution round 11 
Berlin (Group 2) 
1 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 1 
2 1 3 4 2   1 1 1 * 
3 0 0 4 6   * 0 1 1 
4 0 0 3 7   0 * 1 1 
5 0 0 2 8   * 0 1 1 
6 1 2.5 3 3.5   1 1 1 * 
7 0 1 4 5   0 * 1 1 
8 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 1 
9 5 5 0 0   1 1 1 * 
10 0 0 0 10   * 0 1 1 
11 0 1 3 6   0 * 1 1 
12 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 1 
13 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 1 
14 0 10 0 0   0 1 1 * 
15 0 0 3 7   * 0 1 1 
16 0 0 2 8   0 * 1 1 
17 0 1 2 7   * 0 1 1 
18 0 1 3 6   0 * 1 1 
19 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 1 
20 0 10 0 0   0 1 1 * 
21 0 1 2 7   * 0 1 1 
22 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 1 
23 0 10 0 0   0 1 1 * 
      Timeout: Random solution round 9 
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Table A2: Overview of proposals and reactions (continued) 
 Proposal  Reactions (0=Accept, 1=Reject) 
Round L5 L10 L15 L20  P5 P10 P15 P20 
Berlin (Group 3) 
1 0 2 3 5  0 0 * 0 
          
Berlin (Group 4) 
1 0 0 2.5 7.5   * 0 0 0 
          
Galway (Group 1) 
1 1 2 3 4   0 * 1 0 
2 1 2 2 5   * 1 0 0 
3 1 1 3 5   0 0 * 0 
          
Galway (Group 2) 
1 1 2 3 4   * 1 0 0 
2 0 2 3 5   0 1 * 1 
3 2 4 4 0   1 1 1 * 
4 0.5 0.5 3 6   1 * 0 1 
5 0.5 1 2.5 6   1 0 * 1 
6 0 0 10 0   1 0 1 * 
7 0 2 3 5   * 1 0 1 
8 0 0 5 5   0 * 0 1 
9 0 0 5 5   0 * 0 1 
10 0 0 0 10   0 0 * 1 
11 5 5 0 0   1 1 0 * 
12 0 1 3 6   * 0 0 1 
13 0 0 4.5 5.5   0 * 0 1 
14 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 0 
15 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5   1 1 0 * 
16 0 2 3 5   * 1 0 1 
17 0 0 5 5   0 0 * 1 
18 0 2 3.5 4.5   * 1 0 1 
19 0 0 4 6   0 * 0 1 
      Timeout: Random solution round 8 
Galway (Group 3) 
1 3 3 1 3   1 1 * 1 
2 1 2 3 4   1 1 1 * 
3 1 1 4 4   * 0 1 0 
4 0 0 3 7   0 * 1 1 
5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5   * 1 0 1 
6 0.5 1.5 3 5   1 1 0 * 
7 0 1 4 5   0 * 0 0 
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Table A2: Overview of proposals and reactions (continued) 
 Proposal  Reactions (0=Accept, 1=Reject) 
Round L5 L10 L15 L20  P5 P10 P15 P20 
Galway (Group 4) 
1 3 3 1 3   1 1 * 0 
2 1 1 4 4   1 * 1 0 
3 - - - -   * - - - 
4 1 2 3 4   1 0 0 * 
5 0 2 3 5   * 0 0 0 
          
Galway (Group 5) 
1 0 0 5 5   1 1 1 * 
2 0 2 3 5   * 1 0 0 
3 0 0 3 7   0 * 1 0 
4 - - - -   - - * - 
5 0 1.5 2.5 6   * 1 1 0 
6 0.2 1.8 3.2 4.8   1 1 * 0 
7 0 0 2.5 7.5   0 0 0 * 
          
Galway (Group 6) 
1 1 2 3 4   * 0 0 0 
          
Galway (Group 7) 
1 0 0 3 7   0 * 1 1 
2 0 1 4 5   * 0 1 0 
3 1 1 2 6   1 0 * 1 
4 1.5 2 3 3.5   1 0 1 * 
5 1.5 2 2.5 4   1 0 * 1 
6 5 0 2.5 2.5   1 * 0 1 
7 0 1.5 3 5.5   * 0 1 1 
8 1 2 3 4   0 0 1 * 
9 1 2 2.5 4.5   1 0 * 0 
10 0 2 3 5   * 0 1 1 
11 1 1.5 3 4.5   1 0 1 * 
12 0.5 2 3 4.5   0 * 1 0 
13 0.5 2 3 4.5   * 0 1 0 
14 0.7 2 2.3 5   0 0 * 1 
      Timeout: Random solution round 8 
Halle 2015 (Group 1) 
1 - - - - 1 * - - - 
2 - - - - 2 - * - - 
3 3 3 2 2   0 1 * 0 
4 1 2 3 4   1 0 0 * 
5 3 3 2 2   * 1 1 0 
6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5   1 1 0 * 
7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5   1 0 * 0 
8 1 2 3 4   1 * 0 0 
9 0 0 5 5   0 0 * 0 
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Table A2: Overview of proposals and reactions (continued) 
 Proposal  Reactions (0=Accept, 1=Reject) 
Round L5 L10 L15 L20  P5 P10 P15 P20 
Halle 2015 (Group 2) 
1 4 2 2 2   * 0 0 0 
          
Halle 2015 (Group 3) 
1 1 2 2 5   0 1 * 1 
2 1 2 3 4   1 0 0 * 
3 1 2 3 4   * 1 0 0 
4 0.5 1.5 2.5 5.5   0 * 0 1 
5 0.5 1.5 3 5   * 0 1 1 
6 1 2 3 4   1 1 1 * 
7 0.5 1.75 2.75 5   0 * 1 1 
8 0 0 0 10   0 0 * 1 
9 0.5 1.5 3.5 4.5   1 0 1 * 
10 0.5 0 0 10   * 0 0 1 
11 0 1 2 7   0 * 0 1 
12 0 0 0 10   0 0 * 1 
13 0 0 0 10   0 0 * 1 
14 0 2 3 5   0 1 1 * 
15 0 0 0 10   * 0 0 1 
16 0 1 2 7   0 * 0 0 
          
Halle 2015 (Group 4) 
1 1 2 3 4   1 0 * 0 
2 0 2 3 5   0 * 0 1 
3 0.25 2 3.25 4.5   * 0 0 1 
4 0.5 2 3 4.5   0 0 0 * 
          
Halle 2015 (Group 5) 
1 3 3 2 2   1 1 0 * 
2 1 2 3 4   * 1 0 0 
3 0 0 3 7   0 * 1 1 
4 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 0 
5 0.5 2 3.5 4   * 1 1 1 
6 5 3 1 1   1 1 * 0 
7 1 2 3 4   1 1 0 * 
8 0 0 2.5 7.5   0 * 1 1 
9 5 0 0 5   1 1 * 1 
10 0.75 2.25 3.25 3.75   * 1 0 0 
11 - - - -   - - - * 
12 0 0 1 9   0 * 0 1 
      Timeout: Random solution round 4 
Halle 2015 (Group 6) 
1 0 2 3 5   * 0 0 0 
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Table A2: Overview of proposals and reactions (continued) 
 Proposal  Reactions (0=Accept, 1=Reject) 
Round L5 L10 L15 L20  P5 P10 P15 P20 
Halle 2016 (Group 1) 
1 0 0 2.5 7.5   0 * 0 1 
2 0 0.5 3 6.5   * 0 1 0 
3 0.75 1.75 2.5 5   0 1 * 0 
4 1 1 2 6   1 1 0 * 
5 0.25 0.75 3 6   * 0 1 0 
6 0 1 3 6   0 1 1 * 
7 0.25 0.75 2.5 6.5   0 0 * 0 
          
Halle 2016 (Group 2) 
1 0 0 3 7   * 0 1 1 
2 0 1 4 5   0 1 * 0 
3 0 1.5 3 5.5   0 1 1 * 
4 0 0 2.5 7.5   0 * 0 1 
5 0 1 2 7   0 1 * 1 
6 0 4 6 0   1 1 1 * 
7 0 1 3.5 5.5   * 1 0 1 
8 0 0 0 10   0 * 0 1 
9 0 0 3 7   0 * 0 1 
10 0.01 0.24 2.5 7.25   0 0 * 1 
11 1 4 5 0   1 1 1 * 
      Timeout: Random solution round 3 
Halle 2016 (Group 3) 
1 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 0 
2 0 1 3 6   0 0 0 * 
          
Halle 2016 (Group 4) 
1 5 1 1 3   1 1 * 0 
2 0 0 3 7   0 * 0 0 
          
Halle 2016 (Group 5) 
1 0 2 3 5   0 1 0 * 
2 0.5 2 3 4.5   * 1 0 0 
3 0 0 3 7   0 * 0 0 
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Table A2: Overview of proposals and reactions (continued) 
 Proposal  Reactions (0=Accept, 1=Reject) 
Round L5 L10 L15 L20  P5 P10 P15 P20 
Halle 2016 (Group 6) 
1 0 2 3 5   * 1 0 1 
2 0 0 0 10   0 * 0 1 
3 1 2 3 4   0 1 0 * 
4 0 0 2.5 7.5   0 0 * 1 
5 0 1 4 5   * 1 0 0 
6 0 0 10 0   0 * 1 0 
7 0 2 3.25 4.75   0 1 0 * 
8 0 2 3 5   0 1 * 0 
9 0 2 4 4   0 1 * 0 
10 0 0 0 10   * 0 0 1 
11 0 2 2.75 5.25   0 1 0 * 
12 0 0 3.5 6.5   0 * 0 1 
13 0 0 0 10   * 0 0 1 
14 1 2.5 3 3.5   0 1 * 0 
15 0 0 3 7   0 * 0 1 
16 0 0.75 3 6.25   0 0 0 * 
          
Halle 2016 (Group 7) 
1 0 0 3 7   1 * 0 0 
2 0 10 0 0   * 1 0 0 
3 0 1 2 7   1 0 * 0 
4 0 1 3 6   1 0 1 * 
5 0 0 2.5 7.5   1 0 * 0 
6 0 0 2 8   1 * 0 0 
7 0 0 0 10   * 0 0 1 
8 0 0.5 1.5 8   1 0 0 * 
9 0.5 0.5 2 7   1 0 * 0 
10 0 2 5 3   * 1 1 0 
11 0 0 1.5 8.5   1 0 0 * 
12 0 0 1 9   1 * 0 0 
      Timeout: Random solution round 9 
Madrid (Group 1) 
1 2 4 2 2   0 * 0 0 
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Table A2: Overview of proposals and reactions (continued) 
 Proposal  Reactions (0=Accept, 1=Reject) 
Round L5 L10 L15 L20  P5 P10 P15 P20 
Madrid (Group 2) 
1 0 1 3 6   * 1 1 1 
2 3 3 2 2   1 1 * 0 
3 2 3 3 2   1 1 1 * 
4 0 2 3 5   0 * 1 0 
5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5   1 1 * 0 
6 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5   1 1 1 * 
7 1 2 3 4   * 1 1 0 
8 0.75 2 3 4.25   0 * 1 0 
9 0 0 0 10   1 * 0 1 
10 1.5 1.5 1 6   1 1 * 1 
11 0 1.5 3.5 5   0 1 1 * 
12 0 2 3 5   * 1 1 0 
13 0.75 2 3 4.25   0 * 1 0 
14 5 3 1 1   1 1 * 1 
15 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5   1 1 1 * 
      Timeout: Random solution round 13 
Madrid (Group 3) 
1 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 0 
2 3 2.5 2.25 2.25   1 * 0 0 
3 0 2 3 5   * 1 0 0 
4 1 2 3 4   0 0 0 * 
          
Madrid (Group 4) 
1 0 10 0 0   1 1 0 * 
2 0 0 0 10   * 1 0 0 
3 0 0 3 7   0 * 0 1 
4 0 2.5 2.5 5   1 1 * 0 
5 0 0 2.5 7.5   * 0 0 0 
          
Madrid (Group 5) 
1 0 2 3 5   * 1 0 0 
2 0 0 3 7   0 * 0 0 
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Table A2: Overview of proposals and reactions (continued) 
 Proposal  Reactions (0=Accept, 1=Reject) 
Round L5 L10 L15 L20  P5 P10 P15 P20 
Madrid (Group 6) 
1 0 0 0 10   0 * 1 1 
2 1 1.5 2.5 5   * 1 0 0 
3 1.25 2 2.75 4   1 1 * 0 
4 0 1 4 5   0 1 1 * 
5 0.75 1.5 2.75 5   1 1 * 0 
6 0 0 2.5 7.5   0 * 1 1 
7 0 1 3 6   * 1 1 0 
8 0 0 4 6   0 0 1 * 
9 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 0 
10 0 2 3 5   * 1 0 0 
11 0 1 3 6   0 1 0 * 
12 0 0 2.5 7.5   0 * 1 1 
13 0 1 4 5   * 1 1 0 
14 1 2 3 4   1 1 * 0 
15 0 0 3.5 6.5   0 * 1 1 
16 0 2 4 4   0 1 1 * 
17 0 2.5 3.5 4   0 1 0 * 
      Timeout: Random solution round 16 
Note: Li denotes the loss in Euro allocated to players with endowment level i and is short for 
what we denoted as 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) in the theoretical model. Pi reflects the reactions of corresponding 
players. Here, a * designates the proposer. Random or accepted solutions are in bold numbers. 
A “–“  denotes rounds in which a potential proposer abstains from making a proposal within 
the time limit. 
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Table A3: Antagonistic proposals 
Place Group 
Proposal 
(L5, L10, L15, L20) Round 
Proposer 
(Pi) 
Final solution 
(L5, L10, L15, L20) 
Berlin 1 (0, 0, 0, 10) 1 P10 Random: (0, 1, 3, 6) 
      
 2 (0, 0, 0, 10) 10 P5  
 2 (0, 10, 0, 0) 14 P20  
 2 (0, 10, 0, 0) 20 P20  
 2 (0, 10, 0, 0) 23 P20 Random: (5, 5, 0, 0) 
      
Galway 2 (0, 0, 10, 0) 6 P20  
 2 (0, 0, 0, 10) 10 P15 Random: (0, 0, 5, 5) 
      
Halle 2015 3 (0, 0, 0, 10) 8 P15  
 3 (0, 0, 0, 10) 10 P5  
 3 (0, 0, 0, 10) 12 P15  
 3 (0, 0, 0, 10) 13 P15  
 3 (0, 0, 0, 10) 15 P5 Random: (1, 2, 3, 4) 
      
Halle 2016 2 (0, 0, 0, 10) 8 P10 Random: (0, 1.5, 3, 5.5) 
      
 6 (0, 0, 0, 10) 2 P10  
 6 (0, 0, 10, 0) 6 P10  
 6 (0, 0, 0, 10) 10 P5  
 6 (0, 0, 0, 10) 13 P5 Accepted: (0, 0.75, 3, 6.25) 
      
 7 (0, 10, 0, 0) 2 P5  
 7 (0, 0, 0, 10) 7 P5 Random: (0.5, 0.5, 2, 7) 
      
Madrid 2 (0, 0, 0, 10) 9 P10 Random: (0.75, 2, 3, 4.25) 
      
 5 (0, 10, 0, 0) 1 P20  
 5 (0, 0, 0, 10) 2 P5 Accepted: (0, 0, 2.5, 7.5) 
      
 6 (0, 0, 0, 10) 1 P10 Random: (0, 2, 4, 4) 
Note: Li denotes the loss in Euro allocated to players with endowment level i and is a short 
form of 𝑓𝑖(𝜉) in the theoretical model. 
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Table A4: Cross tables of individual and group-specific characteristics and proposals 
 Endowment  Sex  Family income 
First ranked 
theoretical 
solution 
5  
Euros 
10  
Euros 
15  
Euros 
20  
Euros 
 
Female Male  Low Middle High 
𝛼 = 0:  
Equal losses 
3 
(5.6%) 
4 
(7.8%) 
10 
(17.9%) 
10 
(18.9%) 
 6 
(8.5%) 
21 
(14.7%) 
 7 
(13.2%) 
6 
(9.1%) 
14 
(14.7%) 
𝛼 = 1/5: 
Proportional 
6 
(11.1%) 
2 
(3.9%) 
17 
(30.4%) 
15 
(28.3%) 
 13 
(18.3%) 
27 
(18.9%) 
 7 
(13.2%) 
17 
(25.8%) 
16 
(16.8%) 
𝛼 = 1/4  8 
(14.8%) 
5 
(9.8%) 
7 
(12.5%) 
8 
(15.1%) 
 10 
(14.1%) 
18 
(12.6%) 
 12 
(22.6%) 
4 
(6.1%) 
12 
(12.6%) 
𝛼 = 1/3  29 
(53.7%) 
14 
(27.5%) 
13 
(23.2%) 
16 
(30.2%) 
 22 
(31.0%) 
50 
(35.0%) 
 14 
(26.4%) 
26 
(39.4%) 
32 
(33.7%) 
CEA 8 
(14.8%) 
26 
(51.0%) 
9 
(16.1%) 
4 
(7.6%) 
 20 
(28.2%) 
27 
(18.9%) 
 13 
(24.5%) 
13 
(19.7%) 
21 
(22.1%) 
Total 54 
(100%) 
51 
(100%) 
56 
(100%) 
53 
(100%) 
 71 
(100%) 
143 
(100%) 
 53 
(100%) 
66 
(100%) 
95 
(100%) 
Pearson chi2 56.6925 (p<0.001)  3.6380 (p=0.457)  11.7821 (p=0.161) 
Sample size n = 214. Antagonistic proposals are omitted. 
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Table A4 (continued): Cross tables of individual and group-specific characteristics and proposals 
 Future income  Political orientation  Places 
First ranked 
theoretical 
solution Low Middle High  Left Middle Right 
 
Berlin Galway Halle 2015 Halle 2016 Madrid 
𝛼 = 0:  
Equal losses 
0 
(0.0%) 
4 
(12.9%) 
23 
(13.3%) 
 13 
(18.8%) 
5 
(5.1%) 
9 
(19.6%) 
 3 
(7.3%) 
7 
(13.5%) 
8 
(22.9%) 
3 
(6.5%) 
6 
(15.0%) 
𝛼 = 1/5: 
Proportional 
2 
(20.0%) 
14 
(45.2%) 
24 
(13.9%) 
 15 
(21.7%) 
16 
(16.2%) 
9 
(19.6%) 
 9 
(22.0%) 
10 
(19.2%) 
10 
(28.6%) 
3 
(6.5%) 
8 
(20.0%) 
𝛼 = 1/4  1 
(10.0%) 
5 
(16.1%) 
22 
(12.7%) 
 4 
(5.8%) 
14 
(14.1%) 
10 
(21.7%) 
 3 
(7.3%) 
8 
(15.4%) 
6 
(17.1%) 
4 
(8.7%) 
7 
(17.5%) 
𝛼 = 1/3  6 
(60.0%) 
5 
(16.1%) 
61 
(35.3%) 
 26 
(37.7%) 
33 
(33.3%) 
13 
(28.3%) 
 16 
(39.0%) 
23 
(44.2%) 
6 
(17.1%) 
14 
(30.4%) 
13 
(32.5%) 
CEA 1 
(10.0%) 
3 
(9.7%) 
43 
(24.9%) 
 11 
(15.9%) 
31 
(31.3%) 
5 
(10.9%) 
 10 
(24.4%) 
4 
(7.7%) 
5 
(14.3%) 
22 
(47.8%) 
6 
(15.0%) 
Total 10 
(100%) 
31 
(100%) 
173 
(100%) 
 69 
(100%) 
99 
(100%) 
46 
(100%) 
 41 
(100%) 
52 
(100%) 
35 
(100%) 
46 
(100%) 
40 
(100%) 
Pearson chi2 23.8821 (p=0.002)  22.9805 (p=0.003)  39.9404 (p=0.001) 
Sample size n = 214. Antagonistic proposals are omitted. 
 
 
